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"I'LL TRY ANYTHING ONCE": USING THE CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK OF CHILDREN'S HUMAN RIGHTS
NORMS IN THE UNITED STATES
Bernardine Dohrn*
International human rights law provides norms, concepts, and standards of im-
mediate and practical value to attorneys for court-involved children in the United
States. The conceptual framework of the comprehensive rights of the child is
broadly congruent with, or closely related to, the strongest aspects of US. constitu-
tional law and practice. The expansive language of children's human rights offers
an historic opportunity: new tools and a more comprehensive context in which to
change how we think about young people in conflict with the law, children in state
custody, and children in related legal settings. The challenge is to use these fresh
substantive concepts as terms of reference in our work and our thinking, as a prel-
ude and incentive to integrating the "instructive" nature of children's
international law with the interpretation of our own laws and constitutional tra-
ditions. The adoption of the discourse itself can encourage and influence future
implementation of enforceable domestic and international law that expands the
rights and well-being of children.
INTRODUCTION
One of the great philosophers of the twentieth century, Mae
West, once said: "I'll try anything once, twice if I like it, three times
to make sure."' It is time to give human rights concepts and stan-
dards for court-involved children in the United States a try.
International human rights law, particularly children's rights
involving youngsters in conflict with the law and children in state
"protective" custody, offers fresh norms and a powerful conceptual
framework for advocates representing children. Despite legal and
ideological resistance to full U.S. participation in the Convention
on the Rights of the Child 2 ("CRC") and related human rights
* Bernardine Dohrn is Associate Clinical Professor at Northwestern University
School of Law and founding Director of the Children and Family Justice Center, Bluhm
Legal Clinic. Research assistants Pamela K_ Chan, Sarah Terman and Kate Taylor provided
intelligent and detailed work. As always, Toni Curtis is invaluable.
1. PAULA MUNIER, ON BEING BLONDE: WIT AND WISDOM FROM THE WORLD'S MOST
INFAMOUS BLONDES 16 (2004).
2. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.TS. 3 [herein-
after CRC], available at http://wvw.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htn. Note also U.S.
ratification in 2002 of two optional protocols to the CRC: Optional Protocols to the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and on the
Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. Opened for signature July 25,
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treaties,3 we have new tools available in the form of expansive
language and a more spacious framework to change how we think
about young people in conflict with the law, children in state
custody, and children in related legal settings. The challenge is to
use these substantive concepts as terms of reference in our work
and our thinking, as preludes and incentives to integrating the
"instructive, 4 nature of international law and the laws of other
nations with interpretations of our own laws and constitutional
traditions.
Although the United States is the only remaining country ac-
tively opposing adoption of the CRC and one of only two nations
that have failed to ratify the CRC,5 the United States was a major
and active participant throughout the ten-year drafting process. In
part as a consequence of the engaged role of the Unites States in
drafting, U.S. norms regarding the rights and protections of chil-
dren inform the CRC, the world's most comprehensive legal
document on the rights and well-being of children.7
This Article explores the historic opportunity of the human
rights' "[f] ield of [e] mancipatory [p] ossibility:", the radical notion
presented by bringing home a union of human rights and chil-
dren's rights. Much like the strategy of "removal" to federal courts
was to the civil rights movement, 9 children's human rights offers
child advocates a new window, a door,'° an escape from the increas-
2000, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-37 (2000) [hereinafter Optional Protocols]; see also G.A. Res.
54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000).
3. See, e.g., Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of In-
tercountry Adoption, adopted May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 181; Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
4. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
5. Jonathan Todres, Analyzing the Opposition to US. Ratification of the U.N. Convention on
the Rights of the Child, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS
OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION 19 (Jonathan Todres et al.
eds., 2006).
6. CYNTHIA PRICE COHEN & SUSAN H. BITENSKY, ANSWERS TO 30 QUESTIONS 1
(Child Rights Int'l Res. Inst. 1996); see also Cynthia Price Cohen, Role of the United States in
Drafting the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Creating a New World for Children, LoY. POV-
ERTY L.J. 9, 25-26 (1998).
7. Jonathan Todres et al., Overview of THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION 3, 6-7
(Jonathan Todres et al. eds., 2006).
8. David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15
HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 101, 108 (2002).
9. United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, History of the Court of Ap-
peals, http://ww.cal l.uscourts.gov/about/appealshistory.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
10. EMILY DICKINSON, THE COLLECTED POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON 136 (2003) ("Not
knowing when the dawn will come/I open every door....").
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ingly constricted legal analyses of children's rights to full constitu-
tional protection and participation." Yet these human rights
standards and frameworks draw upon and extend familiar constitu-
tional principles. They are family, not foreigners or "outsiders."
This Article will explore, as examples, a range of children's rights
that could immediately become part of our discourse, practice, and
education, a pathway to changing hearts and minds. We can and
should use these legal and linguistic concepts immediately and
consistently before judges, probation officers, caseworkers, correc-
tional authorities, police, and professionals, as well as with
adolescent clients themselves.
Setting aside the legal complexity of whether and how interna-
tional law is applicable in U.S. courts,' 2 this Article emphasizes the
importance of the conceptual child rights language itself, and the
multi-dimensionality and dynamism of human rights as an emerg-
ing field of rapid development. 3 Even in the United States, the
Supreme Court has confirmed the significant influence of interna-
tional law and the CRC in the interpretation of our own
Constitution and traditions."
The CRC as one of the first international human rights treaties
adopted and ratified post-Cold War, is the first to integrate civil and
political rights with economic, social and cultural rights. 5 This
status creates significant opportunities because children's rights-
to survival, development, education, and health care, for in-
stance-cannot be framed or fulfilled without the family and
nation-state to promote those rights, including basic economic
rights. 16 The satisfaction of fundamental economic rights, even for
children, is subject to the modifying standards of "progressive
11. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILEJUSTICE 141-44 (2005).
12. These barriers and hurdles include: U.S. reservations to treaty ratification stating
that treaties are not "self-executing" and thus require parallel domestic legislation; the U.S.
practice of substantive reservations, understandings, and declarations ("RUDs"); and a
dominant legal culture (despite recent Supreme Court language and references) of disdain
for the law of other nations and international law. Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS
778-88 (1999).
13. See generally Bernardine Dohrn, Something's Happening Here: Children and Human
Rights Jurisprudence in Two International Courts, 6 NEV. LJ. 749 (2006).
14. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) ("The opinion of the world com-
munity, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions."); see also Barbara Woodhouse, The Changing Status of
the Child, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY
PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION 51, 60 (Jonathan Todres et al. eds.,
2006).
15. UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of the Child, http://www.unicef.org/crc/
index.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
16. Nigel Cantwell, Children's Rights in Relation to Their Family, in THE UN CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS CONVENTION: THEORY MEETS PRACTICE 389, 393 (A. Alen et al. eds., 2007).
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realisation.' ' 17 Nonetheless, the opportunities to utilize these rights
to improve the well-being of children are potentially dramatic.
Additionally, the integration of children's economic and cultural
rights with civil and political rights reinforces and resonates with
the so-called "indivisibility" of human rights-the ways in which the
rights regime is an integrated structure whose core is the dignity of
every human person."' Paradoxically, while children's rights are
indivisible, integrated, and reinforcing, they can be simultaneously
contested and conflicting.19
As an illustration of the reasons to adopt the human rights
framework here in the United States, consider the example of
adopting the use of "children" as a description of all of our clients
under the age of eighteen, ° following the rest of the world in
adopting the CRC terminology.21 No one refers to their own ado-
lescent children as 'Juveniles" or as "minors." Focus groups at the
time of the Juvenile Court centennial in 1999 confirmed the obvi-
ous connotations: people associate the word 'juvenile" with
"delinquent," or "gangster," or violent criminal, rather than with
their own teenage children who inhabit that mysterious territory
between childhood and adulthood . As the poet Gwendolyn
Brooks wrote of wayward youth: "We real cool. We/Left school.
We / Lurk late. We / Strike straight. We / Sing sin. We / Thin gin.
17. Republic of S. Aft. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 57 (S. Afr.) (discussing "pro-
gressive realization" which means that with an economic right, states are obligated to have a
plan to move forward the realization of that right, but not necessarily to implement it im-
mediately. It springs from a recognition that states must determine economic priorities'
themselves); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS 220-23 (2004).
18. Ton Liefaard, The Right to be Treated With Humanity: Implications of Article 37(c) CRC
for Children in Detention, in THE UN CHILDREN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION: THEORY MEETS PRAC-
TICE 565, 574 (A. Alen et al. eds., 2007); SHARON DETRICK, A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 22 (1999).
19. For example, the rights of mothers (parents) and children may be in contention
or contradiction in areas such as inter-country adoption, corporal punishment, child mar-
riage, female genital cutting, child protection and child custody. See, e.g., Peter Rosenblum,
Teaching Human Rights: Ambivalent Activism, Multiple Discourses, and Lingering Dilemmas, 15
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 301, 306-09 (2002) (noting the potential for ambiguity and conflict in
applying human rights norms).
20. To call an adolescent client a child would require, of course, a conversation and
understanding with the child client, as part of the attorney/client relationship.
21. All but two nations of the world, Somalia and the United States, have ratified the
CRC. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005). Of course, countries in certain regions of
the world, such as Latin America, use both the words "child" and "adolescent" to describe
children who are older teenagers. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, art. 13,
4, adopted Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 (describing the need for "protection of child-
hood and adolescence").
22. Chicago Bar Association & Children's Court Centennial Committee, A Noble
Social Experiment: The First 100 Years of the Cook CountyJuvenile Court 1899-1999 (1999)
(unpublished focus group results, on file with author).
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We /Jazz June. We/ Die soon., 23 Those who work on juvenile issues
are aware that the "general public" may at times consider abused
and neglected children to be innocent victims-as contrasted with
children who are alleged to have committed delinquent offenses. 4
It is simultaneously true that the public views all children in juve-
nile court as similar, overlapping, and "damaged," in the sense of
being hopelessly harmed. 5 Language mirrors these perceptions.
"[W] hen someone under the age of eighteen is in conflict with the
law he or she is a juvenile offender, yet when someone under eight-
een is in need of state protection, reference is made to child
welfare. 26
These negative perceptions of 'juveniles" are due, in large part,
to white supremacist structures and racist stereotypes which make
children of color wildly overrepresented in both domains of juve-
nile justice and child protection. The often dismal consequences
associated with poverty further contribute to fear and hostility di-
rected toward children in conflict with the law.2 ' All the more
reason to reject the use of 'juvenile" and "minor," and to insist on
the language of children, kids, girls, boys, and youngsters-words
that carry with them the promise, potential, and imaginative possi-
bility of childhood, as well as its suffering and turbulence.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT
Two years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court abolished the practice of
executing juvenile offenders, holding that the juvenile death pen-
alty violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and
unusual punishments" because children are categorically less
23. GWENDOLYN BROOKS, We Real Cool, in BLACKS 331, 331 (4th prtg. 1989).
24. Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sen-
tencingPolicy, 88J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 71-72 (1997).
25. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court: Changes and Challenges, Focus ON L. STUD. (A.B.A.,
Chicago, Ill.) Fall 2000, at 1, 1-2.
26. GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
199 (1995).
27. James Bell, Shadowboxing with the Apocalypse: Race and Juvenile Justice, YOUTH LAW
NEWS, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 19; NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQ., AND JUSTICE FOR SOME:
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2007), http://
www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/2007jan-.justice-for-some.pdf; Jason Ziedenberg, Drugs and
Disparity: The Racial Impact of Illinois' Practice of Transferring Young Drug Offenders to
Adult Court, http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/illinois/illinois.html (last visited Sept.
16, 2007); MIKE MALES & DAN MACALLAIR, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF
JUVENILE ADULT COURT TRANSFERS IN CALIFORNIA 5-11 (2000), http://www.
buildingblocksforyouth.org/colorofjustice/coj.pdf;
28. Liefaard, supra note 18, at 565.
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culpable than adults. 29 At its core, Roper reaffirmed the founda-
tional principle of the juvenile court, elaborated over a century ago
with the establishment of the world's first juvenile court in Chi-
cago. ° Children are different than adults, and their misdeeds-
even grave crimes-must be addressed in a distinct system of jus-
tice that takes into account their age, their lesser culpability, and
their greater ability to recover.3' The Roper decision relied on the
differences between children and adults, supported by research on
adolescent development,32 and arrived at by the peculiarities of
evolving standards of decency unique to Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence.33
Surprisingly, the Court devoted several pages to a discussion of
the standards of international human rights law. 4 In expansive
language, the 5-4 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court noted:
"[T] he opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for
our own conclusions.3 5 While this renewed recognition of interna-
tional law and human rights treaties is welcome and deserves
36further exploration, the focus of this Article is on the strategic
opportunities for children's rights created by the expanding ter-
rain of children's international human rights, bolstered by the
reasoning and logic of Roper.
29. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
30. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution ofJuvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century, Be-
yond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 42-43
(Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the establishment of Chicago's juve-
nile court); see also DAVID S. TANENHAUS,JUVENILEJUSTICE IN THE MAKING 4 (2004).
31. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-71 (explaining three general differences).
32. Id. at 569-70.
33. ADAM ORTIZ, AM. BAR ASS'N, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: THE JUVENILE
DEATH PENALTY 1 (2004), http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/EvolvingStandards.pdf.
34. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78.
35. Id. at 578.
36. The Roper Court drew attention to Article 37 of the CRC, "which every country in
the world has ratified save for the United States and Somalia," even remarking that none
have taken exception to Article 37. Id. at 576. The Court wrote further: "It does not lessen
our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express
affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the
centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom." Id. at 578 (emphasis
added).
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II. IMMEDIATE NORMS AND SUBSTANTIVE FRAMING CONCEPTS
This Article selects eight 7 core norms and one framing theory
from the dense tapestry of the CRC to illustrate the value of chil-
dren's human rights to the discourse and narrative of children in
conflict with the law here in the United States. These norms and
substantive framing concepts are:
" children deprived of their liberty;
* arrest, detention or imprisonment only as a last re-
sort and for the shortest appropriate period of time;
* separation from adults when deprived of liberty;
* non-separation of parents and children;
* non-discrimination and equal treatment under the
law;
* right to be heard/to express views;
* right to effective participation/competency; and
* right to reintegration.
The Article concludes with a discussion of the overarching right to
be "treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person.
Because core human rights norms and substantive concepts are
powerful tools in the zealous advocacy for our clients, and because
they strengthen the content of constitutional and legal standards
for children in conflict with the law, we should use them now, re-
gardless of whether or not they are established as literal legal
norms or binding international law. This language humanizes our
child clients. How we think and talk about our child clients and the
rights they possess influences how others respond. Large portions
of the world are engaged in a slow but dynamic dialogue about the
promotion of children's rights and the protection of children.39 A
freshly invented form of common law and best practices is emerg-
ing.4 ° We in the United States could become part of that
37. This selection omits other significant norms of children's rights, such as the right
to have legal assistance, the right to habeas corpus, and the prohibition against torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Similarly, the basic objective of the
best interest of the child is beyond the scope of this Article.
38. CRC, supra note 2, art. 37(c).
39. See, e.g., Off. of the U.N. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., State Reports to the Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child and Concluding Observations, http://www.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/crc/sessions.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
40. Cantwell, supra note 16, at 396 (discussing the proposed United Nations Guide-
lines for the Protection and Alternative Care of Children without Parental Care); Liefaard,
supra note 18, at 580.
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conversation and benefit from its vitality and development, even
short of ratifying treaties and implementing legislation. The adop-
tion of the discourse itself can encourage and influence future
implementation of enforceable domestic and international law that
expands the rights and well-being of children.
This proposal is concrete and immediate. The author intends this
Article to provoke conversation beyond the eight examples explored
here, and to spark debate as to whether and where children's rights
lawyers and advocates can instantly adopt human rights norms as
substantive framing concepts in our work.
A. Children Deprived of their Liberty (Article 3 7)4'
At least one million children worldwide are currently detained,
imprisoned, incarcerated, jailed or held in secure or closed facili-
tiesY.4 The reasons underlying the practice of removing children
from their families and communities, locking them up with one
another only to return them to society with a heavier burden in-
clude deeply-rooted and complex issues, clearly linked to poverty,
discrimination, and fear.43
"Children Deprived of their Liberty" is a human rights formula-
tion totally different from "detained minor" or "incarcerated
juvenile 4 or "sentenced delinquent." It is even unlike the awkward
formulation of CRC's Article 40: "every child alleged as, accused of,
or recognized as having infringed the penal law. 4 First, "children
deprived of their liberty" assumes that children, as persons, have a
right to liberty and that they have been deprived of that condi-
tion-a deprivation requiring some protection, process, and
assurances. This is the very opposite of Justice Rehnquist's infa-
mous and oft repeated dicta in Schall v. Martin that children "are
41. CRC, supra note 2, art. 37.
42. DEF. FOR CHILD. INT'L, KIDS BEHIND BARS: A STUDY ON CHILDREN IN CONFLICT
WITH THE LAW 9 (Stan Meuwese ed., 2003) [hereinafter KIDS BEHIND BARS], http://
www.kidsbehindbars.org/english/docs/RapportKBBtotaal.pdf.
43. The Secretary-General, Report of the Independent Expert for the United Nations Study
on Violence Against Children, 61, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/61/299
(Aug. 29, 2006) (prepared by Paulo S6rgio Pinheiro); PAULO StRGIO PINHEIRO, Violence
Against Children in Care and Justice Institutions, in WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AGAINST
CHILDREN 171, 171-229 (2006), http://www.violencestudy.org/IMG/pdf/5._World_
Report onyiolence-againstChildren.pdf
44. Colleen R. McLaughlin et al., Factors Associated with Parenting Among Incarcerated
Juvenile Offenders, 34 ADOLESCENCE 665, 669 (1999); see, e.g., Lacie Morrison, Juvenile Arsonist
Arrested, MIN. WELLS INDEX, July 27, 2007, http://www.mineralwellsindex.com/homepage/
local-story_208100423.html?keyword=leadpicturestory.
45. CRC, supra note 2, art. 40.
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always in some form of custody.'"' His majority opinion upheld a
New York State preventive detention law, which permitted children
to be confined in a detention center without a probable cause
hearing for up to three days.47
The concept in U.S. law that children have no right to liberty
because they are normally subject to the control and discipline of
their parents gives children the worst of both worlds: they have
fewer rights than adults because they are presumably familiar with
conditions of no control over their circumstances, while at the
same time adults are permitted to incarcerate children "for their
own good, 48 or safety. In Schall, plaintiffs presented evidence that
the vast majority of juveniles held in pretrial detention without a
hearing were released either unconditionally or on parole near the
time of their first court hearing.4 9 Yet Schalljustifies pre-trial incar-
ceration as a measure to keep children from re-offending, and to
protect them from the dangers of their peers and their environ-
ment. 5 Parental custody is thus extended and analogized to
abysmal situations of confinement in jails, prisons, juvenile deten-
tion centers, orphanages, mental health facilities, sexual offender
programs, and drug treatment institutions. Justice Marshall's dis-
sent in Schall noted that pretrial detention is used for punitive
purposes where the "net impact on the juveniles who come within
its purview is overwhelmingly detrimental.,5 ' Twenty years later, we
have substantial evidence documenting that damage, and the harm
to hundreds of thousands of more children who have suffered in-
carceration.52
Second, the human rights concept of "children deprived of their
liberty," articulated in Article 37(b) of the CRC and interpreted by
the Committee on the Child in its General Comment #10, means
46. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
47. "[N]ot more than three days after the conclusion of the initial appearance or four
days after the filing of the petition, whichever is sooner." Id. at 269-70. "[O]ne 3-day exten-
sion possible for good cause shown." Id. at 277.
48. See, e.g., Juvenile Court Act of 1987, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-501 (2006) (pro-
viding that pretrial detention may be "for the protection of the minor").
49. Schall, 467 U.S. at 286-87 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 264-66.
51. Id. at 308 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
52. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, THE CONSEQUENCES AREN'T MINOR: THE IMPACT
OF TRYING YOUTH AS ADULTS AND STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 8-9 (Liz Ryan & Jason Zieden-
berg eds., 2007), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/Downloads/NEWS/National_
Report-consequences.pdf; ROCHELLE STANFIELD, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, PATHWAYS
TO JUVENILE DETENTION REFORM: THE JDAI STORY 6-7 (1999), http://www.aecf.org/
upload/PublicationFiles/dai%20story.pdf; Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Juveniles Within Adult
Correctional Settings: Legal Pathways and Developmental Considerations, 4 INT'LJ. FORENSIC MEN-
TAL HEALTH 1, 1-18 (2005), http://www.iafmhs.org/files/Woolardspr05.pdf.
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that the "[u] se of pretrial detention as a punishment violates the
presumption of innocence."5 3 General Comment #10 provides that
the elements required to deprive a child of liberty, as well as the
confinement, the duration, and regular reviews, be subject to clear
legal limits and strict conditions. 4 Allowing children to languish in
detention is a grave violation because of the clear link between vio-
lence against children and their institutionalization.
In a recent European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") case,
Selcuk v. Turkey, a sixteen year old arrested for robbery of a computer
from an elementary school was ordered by the court to be detained
with adults. 56 The child's attorney challenged the order, repeatedly
citing both the European Convention on Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms Article 5(3) (trial within a reasonable time or
release pending trial), and, surprisingly, CRC Article 37(b) (depri-
vation of liberty as a last resort, and for the shortest appropriate
period of time) . The ECHR unanimously held that the failure to
take into account the age of the child, who was confined in con-
tinued pre-trial detention with adults, was a violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
58doms.
Third, this "deprivation of liberty" framework for children ap-
plies not just to "training schools," juvenile correctional facilities,
or prisons, but to all forms of child confinement, however benign
the name and stated purpose. This includes any other form of
placement in a public or private custodial setting from which the
child is not permitted to leave at will by order of any judicial, ad-
ministrative or other public authority.59 The range encompasses
group homes, residential treatment, training schools, orphanages,
mental health institutions, drug treatment facilities, centers for the
confinement of unaccompanied immigrant children in deporta-
53. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, General Comment No. 10: Children's Rights in Juvenile
Justice, 91 80, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10 (Feb. 2, 2007), available at http://www.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/crc/docs/CRC.C.GC.10.pdf.
54. Id. 91 79-84.
55. PINHEIRO, supra note 43, at 190.
56. Selhuk v. Turkey, App. No. 21768/02, 5 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 10, 2006).
57. Id. 91 13, 16, 26-37.
58. Id. 91 37 (holding that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Conven-
tion).
59. DETRICK, supra note 18, at 629 (citing Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, General
Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Periodic Reports to be Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 44, Paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/58, at 40 n.1 (1996)); VAN
BUEREN, supra note 26, at 206.
[VOL. 41:1
"I'll Try Anything Once"
tion proceedings, and institutions for sexual offenders.Y0 This
broader definition of deprivation of liberty is resonant given the
history of "caging kids"'6 under different labels, based on different
rationales over the past century. The recent growth of private




Thus, international law seeks to limit the deprivation of chil-
dren's liberty in two ways: first, to divert children away from the
formal systems of juvenile or criminal law with alternative sanc-
tions; 4 second, to restrict arrest, detention and incarceration.5
B. Arrest, Detention or Imprisonment Only as a Last Resort
and for the Shortest Appropriate Period of Time
(Article 3 7(b))6"
This core statement on the uses of criminal justice remedies re-
garding children (people under the age of eighteen years) is
worthy of rigorous analysis and regular use. It includes not only
two forms of deprivation of liberty (detention and imprisonment),
but it also includes the little explored limits on the arrest of chil-
dren by police and law enforcement officials.
Arrest of children only as a last resort creates a barrier at the
core point of entry into the system of justice for children, the po-
lice, and carries significant consequences. In fact, arrest as a "last
resort" was once a practical cornerstone of most policing practices
toward children in conflict with the law. Until the current wave of
harsh laws and policies across the United States began in 1986, ap-
proximately two-thirds of police contacts with children resulted in
a warningY' If the arrest itself must be a last resort in police-youth
60. Paul Lerman, Twentieth-Century Developments in America's Institutional Systems for Youth
in Trouble, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 74, 74 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds.,
2002).
61. A phrase used by Bart Lubow, director of the Annie E. Casey Juvenile Detention
Alternatives Initiative.
62. Lerman, supra note 60, at 78-81.
63. Id.
64. U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10, supra note 53, 1 22-29; VAN BUEREN, supra note 26, at
211.
65. VAN BUEREN, supra note 26, at 211.
66. Article 37(b) of the CRC provides that: "The arrest, detention or imprisonment of
a child shall be .. .used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate
period of time." CRC, supra note 2, art. 37(b).
67. Id.
68. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT'L CENTER FORJUV. JUST.,JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 96 (2006), http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/
ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf; Anne L. Stahl, Juvenile Court Processing of
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encounters, a range of non-judicial alternative remedies or inter-
ventions must be available, as provided by Article 40(3) (b) of the
CRC.69 Those alternatives might include a warning, contact with
parents and family conferencing, restorative justice, compensation,
or community service. But all interventions without judicial pro-
ceedings must include the protections of due process (or "human
rights and legal safeguards," in the terms of international law and
the CRC). Diversion measures must not become either a justifica-
tion for bringing more children into the system of policing and
criminal justice (known as "widening the net") or serve as a pretext
for doing away with vital legal safeguards in the name of informal
help or treatment for the child. General Comment #10 specifies,
for example, that in cases of diversions from court proceedings
there must be convincing evidence that the child committed the
offense, that the child freely and voluntarily acknowledges respon-
sibility without intimidation or pressure, and that the
acknowledgement not be used against the child in any subsequent
legal proceeding.0
A century of research documents the negative consequences of
detention and incarceration on both the right to life, survival, and
development of the child 71 and the right to reintegration into soci-
ety.72 The high level of violence that accompanies most
institutionalization of children 73 is a major reason for setting high
barriers and conditions for the decision to deprive a child of
his/her liberty. In addition, the stigma of arrest, detention and in-
carceration creates formidable obstacles to the goal of
reintegration. 4
Each year, revelations of snake pit conditions for incarcerated
children are splashed across headlines and result in momentary
scandals. Recall, for example: Georgia's juvenile correctional
Delinquincy Cases, 1986-1995, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Fact
Sheet (U.S. Department ofJustice), Apr. 1999, at 1.
69. Article 40(3)(b) of the CRC provides that: "Whenever appropriate and desirable,
measures for dealing with such children without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing
that human fights and legal safeguards are fully respected." CRC, supra note 2, art. 40(3) (b).
70. U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10, supra note 53, 27, pt. 3.
71. See, e.g., Kristina H. Chung, Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of Incarcerating Juveniles in
Adult Jails, 66 IND. L.J. 999, 1006-08 (1991); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile
Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 715-17 (1991); Dorothy 0. Lewis et al., A Clinical Follow-Up of
Delinquent Males: Ignored Vulnerabilities, Unmet Needs, and the Perpetuation of Violence, 33 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 518, 518-28 (1994).
72. See infra notes 101,106, 109 and accompanying text.
73. PINHEIRO, supra note 43, at 175.
74. VAN BUEREN, supra note 26, at 217-18.
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71 7' 77
system, Jena and Tullulah, private juvenile correctional facilities
in Louisiana, Baltimore juvenile detention, the Cook County JuS 79
venile Temporary Detention Center in Chicago, California Youth
Authority, ° and the Texas Youth Commission system.8'
"Last resort" and for the "shortest appropriate period of time"
are also the standards or norms for any incarceration of children
(both pre-trial detention and post-adjudication).8' The last resort
and shortest appropriate period of time requirements of the CRC
are based on the 1985 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Ad-
ministration of Juvenile Justice 3 and the 1990 UN Rules for the
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, 4 both non-
binding resolutions. The CRC treaty standards include any other
deprivation of liberty for children in different systems of "care" or
custody-including mental health institutions, drug treatment fa-
cilities, group homes and orphanages, or sexual offender facilities,
as described above. This suggests that alternatives to detention and
incarceration must be available and used (alternatives such as eve-
ning report centers, home confinement, and probation
conditions) .
The challenge of Roper is to integrate international human rights
law and the practice of other nations with our own constitution
and traditions. These concepts of "last resort" and "shortest
75. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Children's Rights: Juvenile Justice, in WORLD REPORT 1999
(1999), http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/children/child3.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
76. Fox Butterfield, Privately Run Juvenile Prison in Louisiana is Attacked for Abuse of 6 In-
mates, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2000, at A14.
77. Fox Butterfield, Profits at a Juvenile Prison Come with a Chilling Cost, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 1998, at Al.
78. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No MINOR MATrER: CHILDREN IN MARY-
LAND'SJAILS (1999), http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/maryland/.
79. PATRICIA CONNELL & MALCOLM C. YOUNG, JOHN HOWARD ASS'N OF ILL., AN ASSO-
CIATION REPORT: VOLUNTEER VISIT TO THE COOK COUNTY JUVENILE TEMPORARY DETENTION
CENTER 20-21 (2006), http://www.john-howard.org/images/FINALREPORTCCJTDC-
WITHTOC-COVER-GRAPHIC_8-23-06.pdf.
80. Mark Martin, Youth Authority: 'Factory for Prisons', S.F. CHRON., Feb. 3, 2004, at Al;
Dean E. Murphy, California Settles Lawsuit on Juvenile Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at A18;
Denny Walsh, Family Sues over Teen's Prison Death, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 29, 2006, at BI.
81. Gregg Jones et al., TYC Facilities Ruled by Fear, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 18,
2007, at IA; DougJ. Swanson, TYC Sex Allegations Exceed 750, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar.
7, 2007, at IA.
82. VAN BUEREN, supra note 26, at 214; see also CRC, supra note 2, art. 37 (b).
83. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Jus-
tice (The Beijing Rules), G.A. Res. 40/33, R. 13, 17, 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29,
1985); DETRICK, supra note 18, at 630.
84. United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty,
G.A. Res. 45/113, R. 1, 2, 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990); DETRICK, supra
note 18, at 630.
85. U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10, supra note 53, 28(a).
FALL 2007]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
appropriate period of time, 86 may be brought to life as a revival,
expansion, and renewed interpretation of the "least restrictive en-
vironment" standard under U.S. law,"7 of the Constitutional
requirement of proportionality,88 and of the standard of the "lesser
culpability of the juvenile offender." 9 "Last resort" and "shortest
appropriate period of time" are terms children's lawyers and advo-
cates could be using throughout the process: from the first
probable cause hearing, to hearings on revocation of probation,
and through dispositional/sentencing proceedings. The overlay of
these terms with familiar U.S. legal standards can breathe new sub-
stantive life into U.S. legal concepts.
C. Separation from Adults when Deprived of Liberty (Article 37(c))0
Every child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity
and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,
and in a manner which takes into account the needs of per-
sons of his or her age. In particular, every child deprived of liberty
shall be separated from adults unless it is considered in the
child's best interest not to do so .... 91
This right, for children deprived of liberty, is the right to have
their age, their youthfulness, serve as a barrier to being confined
with adults. 92 It means that there is an affirmative responsibility to
take into account the needs of an individual that age and to limit
deprivation to the possible minimum.93 It embraces the concepts of
special protection and special accommodations and includes all
domains of deprivation of liberty: child protection, mental health,
drug treatment, sexual offenders, detention, and corrections.
In addition to the CRC provision and the UN Rules above, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),
ratified by the United States, provides in Article 10 that both chil-
dren accused of a crime and children convicted of a crime be
86. Note that the standard in the United Nations Rules for the Protection ofJuveniles
Deprived of Their Liberty is "shortest possible duration." G.A. Res. 45/113, supra note 84, R.
17. Similarly Rule 13(1) of the Beijing Rules provides: "Detention pending trial shall be used
only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period of time." G.A. Res.
40/33, supra note 83, R. 13(1).
87. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1412(A) (5) (2000).
88. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
89. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
90. CRC, supra note 2, art. 37(c).
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. DETRICK, supra note 18, at 679.
93. Liefaard, supra note 18, at 569.
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separated from adults. 4 As significantly, in terms of current prac-
tice here in the United States, the ICCPR provides: "Juvenile
offenders shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment
appropriate to their age and legal status. "''
The concept of "separation from adults" and "segregation from
adults" is stronger than, but similar to, the U.S. federal mandate of
"sight and sound" separation of children from adults in jails and
their speedy removal whenever they are placed in an adult jail. "
This mandate of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act does not-but clearly should-include adult prisons and cor-
rectional facilities.97  Despite this longstanding mandate for
separation in jails, there are 7000 youngsters held in adultjails on a
given day in the United States, and forty states permit or mandate
that children charged as adults be detained in adult jails.9 This
208% increase since 1990 is principally due to the fiction of declar-
ing that children who are tried as adults are no longer children,
even though they are overwhelmingly tried for non-violent of-
fenses, ranging from bicycle theft to stealing gym clothes.99
The meaning of "separated from adults" has been elaborated by
the Committee on the Rights of the Child in their recent General
Comment #10. In it, the Committee notes bluntly: "Every child de-
prived of liberty shall be separated from adults. A child deprived of
his/her liberty shall not be placed in an adult prison or other facil-
ity for adults."'00 Co-mingling with adults or being in an adult
facility jeopardizes children's safety, well-being, prospects for avoid-
ing recidivism, and ability to reintegrate into society 0' Further, the
Committee urges separate facilities for children deprived of their
94. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art.
10(2)(b), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] ("Accused juvenile persons
shall be separated from adults and brought as speedily as possible for adjudication.") (emphasis
added); see also The Secretary-General, Reservations, Declarations, Notifications and Objections
Relating to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocols
Thereto, at 40, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2/Rev.4 (Aug. 24, 1994).
95. ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 10(3) (emphasis added).
96. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act requires "sight and sound
separation" between adults and non-transferred juveniles. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5633(a) (a) (I I)-
(12).
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5785 (2000); Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 223(a) (13), 88 Stat. 1109, 1121 (1974) (providing mandates
as a condition of federal financial aid including one requiring the separation of children
from adults in jails).
98. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTHJUSTICE, supra note 52, at 7.
99. Id. at 6.
100. U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10, supra note 53, 85.
101. Id.
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liberty to include "distinct, child-centered staff, personnel, policies,
and practices. '
The standard of separation is bolstered by international human
rights court decisions in individual cases, such as the case of Minors
in Detention v. Honduras, decided by the Inter-American Commis-
sion of Human Rights in 1999.03 In that case, the Commission
concluded that the conditions of confinement for children incar-
cerated with adult prisoners in an adult penal institution violated
the American Convention on Human Rights, Honduran law, and
the CRC. 10 4 The case involved children held, sometimes with eighty
adult prisoners in a cell; unsurprisingly, rape, physical assault, and
abuse of the children were well documented. 0 5 The Commission
held that incarcerating children "in adult penal institutions, thus
placing their physical, mental and moral health in serious peril"
violated the American Convention on Human Rights0 6 and took
notice of Article 37 of the CRC as part of its analysis."
7
Evidence of harm to U.S. children confined with adults in adult
correctional facilities in Florida and California is well documented
and undisputed.' Each day, more than 2000 youth are confined in
adult prisons.'l " Children in adult penal institutions, even those in
a "separate" wing or building, nonetheless have adult prison
guards and are subject to extraordinarily high risk of sexual assault,
beatings, and suicide."0 Furthermore, after release, children con-
fined in adult facilities re-offend sooner, commit more serious
offenses, and face more charges than children with similar offense
convictions who serve their time in juvenile correctional facilities."'
More children are incarcerated with adults because more chil-
dren are being tried in adult criminal courts. By the early 1990s,
102. Id.
103. Minors in Detention v. Honduras, Case 11.491, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
41/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/I1.102, doc. 6 rev., at 575 (1999).
104. Id. 1 69, 73-75, 146.
105. Id. 1, 3, 7, 68, 130-132.
106. Id. 98.
107. Id. 2, 73, 115, 139, 148.
108. Lawrence Winner et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Reexamining Re-
cidivism over the Long Term, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 548, 557-59 (1997); see also CAMPAIGN FOR
YOUTH JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 1-4 (n.d.), http://
ww.campaig-i4youthjustice.org/Downloads/KeyResearch/FactSheetCollateralConsequenc
es.doc.
109. See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OFJUST., PRISON AND JAIL IN-
MATES AT MIDYEAR 2005 1 (2006), http://wwr.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjinO5.pdf.
110. Angela McGowan et al., Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer
ofJuveniles from the Juvenile Justice System to the Adult Justice System: A Systematic Review, 32 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. (Supp. 1), Apr. 2007, at S7, S17.
111. Jeffrey Fagan, The Comparative Advantage ofJuvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on
Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 LAw & POL'Y 77, 98-101 (1996).
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most states had passed legislation to facilitate trying children
through mandatory legislative transfer 2 (statutory exclusion), low-
ering the age of criminal jurisdiction, and/or allowing prosecutors
to try children as adults at their sole discretion." 3 When one ac-
counts for the number of states whose adult criminal jurisdiction
begins at sixteen or seventeen years of age (rather than at eight-
een), as well as those transferred or waived to adult criminal
courts, approximately 200,000 youngsters each year (20-25% of all
children in conflict with the law) are tried in adult criminal
courts. 1 14 It is now well-documented that transferring youngsters to
the adult justice system-holding constant for offense, histories,
and age-generally increases their rates of violence." 5 Overall,
transferred juveniles were 33.7% more likely to be rearrested for a
violent or other crime.'"
It is worth noting that when the United States ratified the
ICCPR,' 7 it took a reservation to Article 10(3),"" stating that: "the
United States reserves the right, in exceptional circumstances, to treat
juveniles as adults .. ,,1"" Whether one counts all 200,000 children
under the age of eighteen tried in adult courts each year, or only
the children transferred or waived (excluding those in states where
the juvenile court jurisdiction ends at sixteen or seventeen), 20 the
number of children in the United States treated as adults is far be-
yond "exceptional circumstances." This patent violation of treaty
responsibilities makes it more incumbent on children's attorneys
112. Legislative or mandatory transfer is where state statute provides that children who
are a certain age and who are charged with certain offenses must be transferred to adult
criminal court. Robert 0. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OFJUVENILE JUSTICE 45, 64-66 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
113. PATRICK GRIFFIN, NAT'L CTR. FOR JoY. JUST., TRYING AND SENTENCING JUVENILES
AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER AND BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS 2-3 (2003),
http://ncjj.servehttp.com/NCJJWebsite/pdf/transferbulletin.pdf; David S. Tanenhaus, The
Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OFJUVENILE JUSTICE
13, 20 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
114. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 52, at 6. See generally Donna M. Bishop,
Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, in 27 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 81 (Michael Tonry ed., 2000).
115. McGowan, supra note 110, at S20.
116. Michael Tonry, Treating Juveniles as Adult Criminals: An latrogenic Violence Prevention
Strategy if Ever There Was One, 32 AM.J. PREVENTIVE MED. (SuPP. 1) S3, S3-$4 (2007).
117. ICCPR, supra note 94.
118. 'Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment ap-
propriate to their age and legal status." Id. art. 10(2)(b). Note that the United States also
took a reservation to the provision prohibiting the juvenile death penalty. Id. art. 6(5).
119. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2/Rev.4, supra note 94, at 40 (emphasis added).
120. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OFJUST.,JUVENILE OFFEND-
ERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 86, 106 (Off. Juv. just. & Delinq. Prevention
1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/toc.html (last visited
Sept. 19, 2007).
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to insist on separation of children from adults when detained or
confined, and to treatjuveniles as children, not adults.
D. Non-Separation of Parents and Children (Article 9)121
Article 9 of the CRC is a strong affirmation of the importance of
parents to children. This flips'the script on the core U.S. approach
to abused and neglected children, which linguistically, substan-
tively, and procedurally severs children from their nest within a
family and from their relationship with their parents. "States Par-
ties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her
parents against their will, except .... The starting point here is
the child's right not to be separated, and the state obligation is that
the child not be separated from her parents against their will. The
exception is the need to balance the right of the child to protec-
tion from maltreatment, 123 which is difficult to weigh in practice.
State Parties have an affirmative obligation to take positive meas-
ures to prevent the separation of a child from her parents "against
their will.', 24 Leading commentators suggest that the drafting his-
tory of the CRC and Article 9 indicates that "against their will"
refers equally to the parents and the child. 25 Yet it is important to
note that, despite widespread misperceptions, the CRC does not
provide for a child's right to a family.
26
As an example of the CRC's affirmation of the importance of
parents to children, the U.N. Committee on the Child makes con-
crete recommendations to prevent the abandonment of children
by their parents, separations frequently a result of economic cri-
ses. 27 Thus, the Committee recommends that states provide for
family support allowances for parents in countries as distinct as
Norway and Kyrgyzstan. 12" The growing presence of child-headed
121. CRC, supra note 2, art. 2.
122. Id.
123. Id. arts. 19, 20.
124. JAAP DOEK, A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, ARTICLE 8 AND ARTICLE 9, at 21 (2006).
125. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO
THE "TRAvAux PRIEPARATOIRES" 168 (Sharon Detrick ed., 1992) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE
TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES].
126. Cantwell, supra note 16, at 392.
127. Id. at 393.
128. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations: Kyrgzstan, I 40(a), U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.244 (Nov. 3, 2005); Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations: Norway,
1 24, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.263 (Sept. 21, 2005).
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households in countries ravished by HIV-AIDS is another economi-
cally-impacted form of abandonment of children by their
parents.12)
Non-separation of children from their parents may have an im-
pact on children of incarcerated parents (requiring creation of
alternatives to institutionalization of parents and/or opportunities
for the child to maintain direct contact with an imprisoned par-
ent). Furthermore, the standard of non-separation includes
children who are forcibly separated from parents when parents
residing illegally in this country are deported.'
°3 0
The importance of non-separation is reinforced by the subse-
quent two paragraphs of the CRC:
* all interested parties (including children) shall be
given an opportunity to participate in the proceed-
ings and make their views known;1
3
'
* the child who is separated from one or both parents
has a right to maintain personal relations and direct
contact with both parents on a regular basis, unless
it is contrary to the child's best interests.'
3
1
The child's right to maintain relationships and direct contact with
parents is brought home to me most vividly each June when I teach
children's rights at a law school in the Netherlands. 3 3 There, my
students are alarmed, even horrified, by the U.S. practice of "ter-
mination of parental rights" as part of the child protection system.
Over the years, Dutch students repeatedly insist that the right to
know their parents is a right belonging to the child, regardless of
whether that child has been abused or neglected, or whether the
child can safely return to live with their parent[s].
Article 9 is largely concerned with the exceptions that make
separation of a child from her parents feasible or necessary: best
129. Cantwell, supra note 16, at 397.
130. Note the 2007 Department of Homeland Security raids on food processing plants in
Massachusetts, resulting in the deportation of parents, whose citizen children immediately
became the responsibility of the Department of Social Services. Monica Rhor, Immigration
Raids Split Families (Mar. 11, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/
articles/2007/03/11/ap-impact-immigrationraids_split_families/. In response to the raids,
Massachusetts Department of Social Services Commissioner Harry Spence said "ICE's [Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement] rhetoric has been completely different from the truth."
Yvonne Abraham, DSS Chief Raps Immigration Agency over Detainees, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13,
2007, at 3B.
131. CRC, supra note 2, art. 9.
132. Id.
133. For five years, I have had the privilege of teaching as visiting professor at Vrieje
University, Amsterdam. This year, I taught at the University of Leiden Law Faculty (June,
2007).
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interests of the child, applicable law and procedure, competent
authorities, subject to judicial review, abuse and neglect, and di-
vorce and custody. "' No one suggests, of course, that the right of
non-separation is without exceptions.1 3 5 The jurisprudence devel-
oped in the European Court of Human Rights over five decades,'36
however, for nations which have also ratified the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, suggests some significant guidelines for the
principle of non-separation articulated in Article 9:
* separation of a child from her parents is necessary
in the best interests of the child if there are no
other measures available to provide the child with
necessary protection; '
7
* separation of a child from her parents should be a
temporary measure, for the shortest time possible,
and subject to regular review; 3 8
* separation should be carried out in a way that re-
unification with the parent is not necessarily
impeded;
39
* yet, it may be that separation from parents is final.
40
An analysis of the jurisprudence of "best interests of the child" in
international law is beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless,
the presumption is that contact between the separated child and her
parent[s] is in her best interests.' 4' Contact can be denied only if it is
contrary to the child's best interests; the burden is on the state.'
42
Article 9 additionally provides that when the separation of a
child from her parents is the result of state action-such as in the
case of child protective removal, incarceration of a parent, or de-
tention of a child-essential information on the whereabouts of
the child or the parent[s] shall be provided. This right to informa-
tion on the whereabouts of the separated child and family is
explicit, but rather weak. 43 Moreover, this right of the separated
134. Cantwell, supra note 16, at 394.
135. Id.
136. European Court of Human Rights Home Page, http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/
(last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
137. DOEK, supra note 124, at 25.
138. Id.




143. CRC, supra note 2, art. 12; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,
art. 19, entered into force Nov. 29, 1999, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990); African Char-
ter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 19, adoptedJune 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.TS. 217.
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child to family information stands in contrast to state practices in
the United States, where the child is not the bearer of the rights
and may have no knowledge of the whereabouts of, or be able to
establish contact with, other siblings in state custody.
44
As discussed below,145 the views of the child on the matter of non-
separation from her parents must enjoy free expression, be taken
into account, and receive due weight in accordance with the age
and maturity of the child.
46
Finally, it is noteworthy that the CRC promotes an approach to
the complex interrelationship of the right of non-separation from
parents and the right of the child to protection from abuse that
firmly supports the primary role of parents and the family in nur-
turing, protecting, and educating the child. 147 Furthermore, it sets
forth the state's role in supporting parents and family, unless and
until they are unwilling or unable to fulfill that role. 14 The CRC
promotes policies, such as family preservation and family-based
alternative care, to limit but not prohibit the child's separation
from her parents.
49
E. Non-Discrimination: Equal Treatment Under the
Law for Children (Article 2)'0'
Children's lawyers often neglect to use the language of non-
discrimination even though children's involvement in legal pro-
ceedings are fraught with unequal, discriminatory consequences at
every stage. The inclusive language of Article 2 of the CRC is
broad: "without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the
child's [or parents'] race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, dis-
ability, birth or other status.' ' 5 While this brief discussion of the
opportunities this norm provides will focus on uncontested racial
144. OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER,
SIBLING PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE 4-5 (2006), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/audits/
allaidits/093006/05s70.pdf; Youth Leadership Advisory Team, Youth Leadership Advisor)
Team Position Paper: Siblings in Foster Care and Adoption, http://www.ylat.org/
leadership/policy/siblingposition.htn (last visited Sept. 19, 2007).
145. See infra Part II.F
146. CRC, supra note 2, art. 12.
147. Cantwell, supra note 16, at 399.
148. Id.
149. CRC, supra note 2.
150. CRC, supra note 2, art. 2.
151. Id.; Daniel L. Skoler, Anti-Discrimination Guarantees Under the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child-Issues and Impact for U.S. Ratification, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S.
RATIFICATION 99, 100 (Jonathan Todres et al. eds., 2006).
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discrimination and white supremacy in the law and practice, there
is work to be done uncovering the child's right to be free of dis-
crimination of any kind: gender-based discrimination for girls in
juvenile justice; 52 the special harm to indigenous children's
rights;' 53 sexual orientation; 15 4 disabled children;15 undocumented
immigrant children;' 56 homeless youth; Arab and Muslim youth;
and those children subject to religious or political discrimination.
Disproportional racial composition in the child welfare and ju-
venile justice systems in the United States is no secret.'57 In large
cities, white children are virtually absent from the juvenile court
systems. 5 1 Instead, children of color, particularly African American,
Latino, and Native American children, comprise a vast majority of
youngsters brought into the system and an even greater proportion
of those transferred to adult criminal court.59 The deeper one goes
into the juvenile and criminal justice system, the greater the racial




30% of referrals to juvenile court;
37% of detained youth;
30% of adjudicated youngsters;
35% of youth judicially waived to adult criminal court;
38% of youth in residential placement (confinement);
and
58% of youth admitted to state adult prison. 6
Disabled children are also overrepresented, and the data on Latino
and Native American youth remains partial or non-existent.
161
152. Woodhouse, supra note 14, at 61. See generally Bernardine Dohrn, All Ellas: Girls
Locked Up, 30 FEMINIST STUD. 302 (2004); GIRL TROUBLE: GIRLS TELL THEIR TRUTH ABOUT
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (New Day Films 2004).
153. CRC, supra note 2, art. 30.
154. See generally Barbara Fedders, Coming Out for Kids: Recognizing, Respecting, and Repr-
sentingLGBTQ Youth, 6 NEV. L.J. 774 (2006).
155. CRC, supra note 2, art. 23.
156. Id. art. 22.
157. See supra note 27.
158. Id.
159. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTHJUSTICE, supra note 52, at 11-12; Ziedenberg, supra note 27.
160. NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, supra note 27, at 37.
161. FRANCISCO A. VILLARRUEL ET AL., IDONDE ESTA LA JUSTICIA?: A CALL TO ACTION
ON BEHALF OF LATINO AND LATINA YOUTH IN THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 38-45 (2002); Bldg.
Blocks for Youth, Native Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, http://ww.
buildingblocksforyouth.org/issues/nativeyouth/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2007).
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Further, as noted by the Committee on the Child in its General
Comment #10, Article 2 requires that children in conflict with the
law be treated equally.12 In contrast to current U.S. constitutional
law and statutes on discrimination, the CRC takes defacto discrimi-
nation and disparities seriously, to be remedied by appropriate
redress, solutions, and compensation.
One example of the CRC's discrimination protection is the
Committee's recommendation that status offenses, such as truancy,
runaways, and vagrancy, be abolished because they are per se dis-
criminatory given that they are not offenses when committed by
adults."36 Equal treatment under the law for children and adults
requires the elimination of status offenses and their consequences:
stigma, victimization, and criminalization of young people.
Every child under the age of eighteen years should enjoy the
same rights, including a separate juvenile justice system based on
the best interest of the child, rather than an adult criminal court.
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, for example,
requires that the state bring minors before "specialized tribunals"
or jurisdictions, "which shall be the only court competent to prose-
cute minors.'"
64
Discrimination exists when children under eighteen years of age
are treated as adults. Those systems that limit juvenile jurisdiction to
those children under sixteen or seventeen, or have statutory excep-
tions that exclude sixteen and seventeen year olds who are charged
with certain offenses, are discriminating against those children.
165
Full, non-discriminatory implementation of juvenile justice rules
should apply to all persons under eighteen years of age.
The core CRC human rights standard of non-discrimination is a
broader, more inclusive legal concept than the U.S. constitutional
mandate of equal protection, as described above.'"" The Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination ("CERD"), which the United States ratified in 1994,
provides a further expansive definition of discrimination:
[T]he term racial discrimination shall mean any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, de-
scent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or
162. U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10, supra note 53, 1 6.
163. Id. 7 8.
164. Minors in Detention k. Honduras, Case 11.491, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
41/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 6 rev., at 575, 1 99 (1999).
165. Id. 17 17,21.
166. DETRICK, supra note 18, at 67; Skoler, supra note 151, at 100.
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exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or
any other field of public life. 167
CERD, taken together with the norms of the CRC, adds two key
elements to non-discrimination rights: a broad obligation of the
state to ensure rights, and the recognition of disparate impact as
well as intentional discrimination. It is difficult not to notice that
there are two systems of justice for children in the United States:
one largely white and private, for children of resourced parents,
and one for children of color and children of poor parents, that is
public. Observers should take notice of the recent report of the
United States to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination that never mentions juvenile justice or the rates
of incarceration of children of color, and the shadow report
domestic children's rights lawyers and activists are preparing to
submit to the Committee. 169
F Right to be Heard! to Express Views (Article 12)170
Perhaps one of the most surprising rights the CRC recognizes is
the right of children to be heard, to express their views freely in all
matters affecting them, and reciprocally, to have their views receive
due weight in accordance with their age and maturity. 7' The sub-
stance of Article 12 has been developing rapidly in the past five
years in ways that are changing the practices of those working for
children's rights.7 2 CRC Article 12 acknowledges that children are
legal, whole persons, with a capacity for independent thought and
existence which is, in part, independent of their family, culture,
and society. This provision challenges centuries of practice relegat-
167. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, adopted Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (emphasis added) (internal quotations
omitted), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm; see also 140 CONG. REC.
14326 (1994) (U.S. declarations and reservations).
168. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA TO THE U.N. COMMIITEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2007), http://www.state.gov/docnments/organization/83517.pdf.
169. See generally CERD Shadow Reporting, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/
cerdshadow/ (last 4isited Sept. 19, 2007).
170. CRC, supra note 2, art. 12.
171. Id.
172. Caroline Vandresse, Participation in the Juvenile Justice System, in PARTICIPATION
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 87, 89 (2006).
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ing children to the status of property or inferior human persons.173
It also presumes that the participation of children in legal and ad-
ministrative proceedings will improve the outcomes for children in
the particular, and strengthen implementation of children's rights
overall.
The right to be heard and to express views is closely linked to
the rights to freedom of expression (Article 13) and to the more
limited but critical right to effective participation for children tried
in adult criminal courts (discussed below) . Ironically, these civil
liberty rights were put forth and pressed forward by the United
States during the Cold War era drafting of the CRC. 11
For children's lawyers, the right to be heard and express views
may be immediately relevant in two important regards. First, chil-
dren's attorneys must acknowledge that their child clients have
views and that the lawyer's task is to solicit these views by providing
all information in understandable forms to their clients prior to
determining the course of the litigation. Indeed, the child's attor-
ney may well be the vehicle through which the child's views are
expressed and heard. Second, the child's right to be heard and ex-
press views may help clarify the ongoing confusion and conflict
over the proper role of the child's attorney: should the attorney
advocate for the expressed views of the child client or represent
their opinion of the child's best interest to the court or administra-
tive decision-maker instead of the child's opinion?175 It may be that
Article 12 tilts the debate toward representing the express views of
the child, wherever possible. At the very least, it may encourage
child lawyers to advocate for the child's views and to ask the court
to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent their best interests only
where necessary.
The right to be heard and to express views is mandated by Arti-
cle 12 in any judicial and administrative proceeding affecting the
child." 7 This is a specific obligation of state parties and for all legal
173. MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE His-
TORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-49 (1994); Woodhouse, supra note 14, at
51-56.
174. See infra Part I1.G.
175. Martha Matthews, Freedom of Expression, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICA-
TION 143, 143 (Jonathan Todres et al. eds., 2006).
176. Bruce A. Green & Bernardine Dohrn, Forward, Children and the Ethical Practice of
Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1281-84, 1294-98 (1996). See generally Martin Guggenheim,
A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399 (1996);
Special Issue, Proceedings of the UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Families: Children's
Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham, 6 NEV. L.J. 592 (2006).
177. Vandresse, supra note 172, at 91.
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proceedings involving the child. 78 It is therefore fundamental for a
fair trial.
G. Right to "Effective Participation "/Competency (ECHR Case Law)
Children tried in adult proceedings must be able to effectively par-
ticipate in their trials. In Europe, the requirement of effective
participation now mandates that the trial court take full account of
the defendants' ages, levels of maturity, and intellectual and emo-
tional capacities, and the court must take steps to promote children's
ability to understand and participate in the proceedings." 9 This stan-
dard is related to U.S. legal concepts of fitness and competency, ]s
but expands the domain. The MacArthur Foundation Research
Network on Adolescent Development, for example, concludes that
"[t]he court should take into account the level of competence of
young defendants to fully participate in criminal proceedings to
better assess their capacity for emotional and psychological matur-
ity, because youth, particularly those under age 15, were more
likely to be incompetent to stand trial due to their developmental
immaturity.....
Effective participation presupposes that the accused has a broad
understanding of the trial process and what is at stake for him, in-
cluding the significance of any penalty that may be imposed. It
does not require that a child understand all legal terminology or
nuances, but it does require a fundamental understanding by the
child defendant of what is said in court, an ability to follow what is
said by prosecution witnesses, the wherewithal to explain to his
lawyers the child defendant's own version of events, and the ability
to make his own lawyers aware of facts which should be put for-
ward in the child's defense. Effective participation is indeed a
higher standard than that currently in place for children tried in
adult criminal courts in the United States. 182
178. Id.
179. See the European Court of Human Rights' ("ECHR") decisions in the adult crimi-
nal trial of two ten year old boys for the infamous child abduction and murder of two year
old James Burger, V v. United Kingdom, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 111, and in the trial of an
eleven year old for attempted robbery of an eighty-seven year old woman, S.C. v. United
Kingdom, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 281.
180. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTHJUSTICE, supra note 52, at 14.
181. Id. (citing MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development
and juvenile justice (Sept. 2006)).
182. V v. United Kingdom, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 11; see S.C. v. United Kingdom, 2004-
IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 281 (holding that S.C. was unable to fully comprehend or participate in the
trial due to his age and impaired intellectual ability).
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England and the ECHR require additional informal procedures
to facilitate the effective participation of child defendants in adult
criminal courts and to mitigate trauma, but these procedures are
not in themselves sufficient to address the concerns."'5 Such meas-
ures include adapting adult procedures by having judges wear less
formal judicial attire, taking more frequent breaks during trial, and
assigning a social worker to sit with child defendants.8 4 When a
child is unable to fully comprehend or participate in the trial
process and cannot adequately give instructions to his attorney,
these child-friendly measures are deemed insufficient."""
With the emerging standard of effective participation for chil-
dren tried as adults in Europe, might U.S. juvenile courts also
require a similar standard? The consequences of a juvenile court
conviction are today more severe than they were twenty years
ago,"' before state laws and homeland security practices authorized
greater use of juvenile court records. Blended sentencing and ex-
tended juvenile jurisdiction statutes increase potential juvenile
court sentences far beyond the age of twenty-one.8 7 With juvenile
court adjudications increasingly resulting in adult-like conse-
quences, it is essential that the child clients be able to effectively
participate by being able to work with their defense attorneys.188
In the United States, we must breathe life into child participa-
tion in trials by expanding our understandings of both child
competency and of due process for children in adult criminal
court. We must consider whether the standard of effective partici-
pation applies also to adjudications with serious consequences in
juvenile courts. One way to utilize the substance of "effective par-
ticipation" is to contrast it with the three major developmental
differences between children and adults, cited by the Supreme
Court in Roper v. Simmons- adolescents lack maturity and have an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility; they are more vulnerable
to negative influences and peer pressure; and the character of a
juvenile is not as formed as that of an adult...
183. S.C. v. United Kingdom, 2004-1V Enr. Ct. H.R. 281.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See generally ZlMRING, supra note 11.
187. Marcy Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The Back-Door to Prison: Waiver Reform, "Blended
Sentencing, "and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 997, 1009-
23 (2001).
188. CATHRYN CRAWFORD ET AL, ILLINOIS: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL &
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 4 (2007); PATRICIA PURI1TZ &
CATHRYN CRAWFORD, NAT'LJUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL & QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 27-62 (2006),
http://wvnjdc.info/pdf/Florida%20Assessment.pdf.
189. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).
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This human rights standard of effective participation narrows
the ability to try extremely young, incapacitated, or emotionally or
intellectually-challenged children in adult criminal court. Further,
the ECHR cases and General Comment #10 provide a practical
roadmap for an expanded recognition of what is required for ef-
fective participation in a trial: basic understanding of the
proceedings and the significance of any penalty, as well as the abil-
ity to follow what is said and to provide one's own version of events
and facts that should be put forward in the defense. The challenge
is to integrate effective participation with due process and compe-
tency without demeaning the child client.
H. Right to Reintegration (Article 40(1))'90
The desirability of promoting "the child's reintegration and the
child's assuming a constructive role in society" frames Article 40,
which addresses the treatment of "every child alleged as, accused of,
or recognized as having infringed the penal law."'19 ' Thus, a major
goal of juvenile justice is to promote the child's recovery and social
reintegration. 19 2 Reintegration is a recognizable element of the juve-
nile justice system in the United States, known as "re-entry." 93 But re-
entry does not contain the fully-connected connotations of reinte-
gration, which contemplates children taking their full place within
the family, the community, and society.'9 4 Reintegration suggests that
children who have been deprived of their liberty are now back in
school and able to live at home, obtain work, and be full participat-
ing citizens. It requires that reintegration be a goal from the
moment of the child's first contact with the legal system. 195 Detention
and incarceration themselves exacerbate the difficulties of reintegra-
tion into society and hamper the child's right to development.' 96
As the Committee on the Rights of the Child notes, reintegration
requires that "no action may be taken that can hamper the child's
190. CRC, supra note 2, art. 40.
191. Id.
192. See VAN BUEREN, supra note 26, at 216; See generally Liefaard, supra note 18.
193. NEELUM ARYNA ET AL., YOUTH LAW CTR., KEYSTONES FOR REFORM: PROMISING JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN PENNSYLVANIA 21-27 (2005), http://
wwwjlc.org/imfc/ke)stonesforreform.pdf; NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., A POR-
TRAIT OF PRISONER REENTRY IN ILLINOIS 1 (2003), http://wwurban.org/UploadedPDF/
410662_[LPortraitReentry.pdf; Office ofJustice Programs, U.S. Dep't ofJusice, State Activities
& Resources for Criminal Reentry: Pennsylvania, http://www.reentry)gov/sar/pa.huni (last
visited Sept. 20, 2007).
194. Id.
195. U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10, supra note 53, 4, pt. 3.
196. Id.
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full participation in his/her community, such as stigmatization, so-
cial isolation, or negative publicity ....,,7 This standard raises the
question of confidentiality, largely lost in the United States but pre-
sumed by the Committee on the Child as part of the right of the
child to have his privacy fully respected at all stages of the proceed-
ings.'5' The goal is to prevent the harm of publicity and stigma
associated with delinquency and crime, and to promote the child's
rehabilitation and recovery. Since the high profile cases of the Cen-
tral Park jogger,' '9 and school shootings,0 ° the media has largely
abandoned all semblance of protecting the identity of juveniles. 0 '
In addition, law enforcement computer data bases, notice provi-
sions (to schools, employers, neighborhoods), '2 2 and post-9/11
criminal record background checks have combined to destroy tradi-
tional notions of juvenile delinquency privacy and confidentiality.0 3
These new conditions of notoriety and access to juvenile justice
information undoubtedly make the goal of reintegration even
more challenging.
Certain categories of child offending contribute to further ob-
stacles to social reintegration. For example, escalated charging by
prosecutors can broaden the identification of offenses as "violent
crimes." The great influx of new delinquency cases coming from
school-based arrests includes a significant number of cases of bat-
tery or simple assault, or aggravated battery and aggravated assault,
where there is no harm or injury resulting from the underlying in-
cident.20 4 The underlying event may involve simple touching or
197. Id. 29.
198. CRC, supra note 2, arts. 16, 40(2) (b) (vii).
199. Craig Wolff, Youths Rape and Beat Central Park Jogger, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1989, at B.
200. See generally ELIZABETH DONOHUE ET AL., CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
SCHOOL HOUSE HYPE: THE SCHOOL SHOOTINGS, AND THE REAL RISKS KIDS FACE IN AMERICA
(1998), http://w-w.cjcj.org/pubs/shooting/shootings.html; KIM BROOKS ET AL., JUSTICE
POLICY INST., SCHOOL HOUSE HYPE: Two YEARS LATER (2000), http://wAW.justicepolicy.
org/images/upload/00-04_REP School HouseHype2_J.pdf.
201. Constance K. Davis, How Iowa Editors are Using Law Expanding Access to Names ofJu-
veniles,J. NEWSPAPER RES., Fall 2000, at 38, 38-49; Grade the News, Should the News Media
Reveal the Name of ajuvenile Murder Suspect Before the Police Have Charged Him? (Oct.
31, 2005), http://w%'.gradethenews.org/feat/makethecall/juti'enile.htm.
202. Franklin E. Zimring, An American Travesty: Legal Responses to Adolescent Sexual
Offending: Executive Summary, http://njjn.org/media/resotIrces/public/resonrce-169.pdf
(last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
203. Office ofJuvenileJustice & Delinquincy Prevention, U.S. Dep't of State, Confiden-
tiality of Juvenile Court Records and Proceedings, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/jjbulletin/
981 1/confidential.html (last Visited Sept. 20, 2007).
204. ELIZABETH SULLIVAN, NAT'L ECON. & Soc. RIGHTS INITIATIVE, DEPRIVED OF DIC-
NITY: DEGRADING TREATMENT AND ABUSIVE DISCIPLINE IN NEW YORK CITY & Los ANGELES
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 7 (Catherine Albisa et al. eds., 2007), http://Nw.nesri.org/programs/
Deprived_oLDignity_07.pdf; JUDITH A. BROWNE, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, DERAILED: THE
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bumping or pushing someone in school, and if the other person is
a teacher or other adult, the charge can be "aggravated"-school
charges often include "weapons" that may be only the child's hand
or foot.0 5 Yet a youngster may have a permanent felony record and
be designated a violent offender for such minor misbehavior.0 0
Furthermore, the child might be suspended or expelled from
school, even when the underlying school arrest is dismissed at the
police station, rejected by the prosecutor, or the child is acquitted
at trial. Enrolling or being readmitted to school is no longer
likely.202 This again creates barriers to reintegration.
Promoting the reintegration of every child alleged as, accused of
infringing, or recognized as having infringed the penal law re-
quires taking into account the child's age at every stage of the
proceedings and anticipating a constructive role in society for the
child. Reintegration is a more comprehensive and inclusive goal
than that of re-entry from detention or correctional institutions.
According to the CRC, it is a major objective of the juvenile justice
system, requiring changes from prevention and arrest as a last re-
sort, to every stage of legal or administrative proceedings involving
children . 2  Reintegration challenges our practices and our think-
ing.
CONCLUSION: TREATMENT WITH DIGNITY (ARTICLE 40)209
To a large degree, all of the above eight human rights standards
for children can be summarized as the right of every child in con-
flict with the law to be treated with "humanity and respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner which
takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age, 20 and "to
be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's
sense of dignity and worth." Perhaps the notion of dignity is the
essence of all human rights. When it comes to children, however,
the promotion of the sense of dignity from the child's perspective
includes broader notions of equality, education, and identity.
SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 14 (2003), http://wv.adxancementproject.org/
reports/Derailerepcor.pdf.
205. See generally SULLIVAN, supra note 204.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. VAN BUEREN, supra note 26, at 216-18.
209. CRC, supra note 2, art. 40.
210. Id. art. 37(c).
211. Id. art. 40(1).
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At the least, treatment with dignity prohibits a range of common
practices imposed on children in conflict with the law: shackling in
court and while being transported to court proceedings; solitary
confinement or isolation measures; blatant racial discrimination;
punishments that include denial of communication or contact with
family members; the denial of education or health care; the use of
pepper spray, tasers, and coercive restraints; or any other discipline
or form of punishment that may compromise the physical or men-
tal health or well-being of the child. 2 It forbids violent practices
denied on paper but all too frequent in practice: beatings, humilia-
tion, racial, gender, and sexual orientation discrimination, rape
and sexual assault,213 and corporal punishment. It prohibits the two
systems of justice that characterize juvenile courts: one public for
children and families of color and the poor, and one private for
white and resourced children and families.
Children are aware that the police stations, lock-ups, court-
rooms, detention centers, probation calendars, and correctional
populations do not reflect the general population demographics.214
They have a heightened sense of injustice, even while those work-
ing in these systems appear to be in denial.
Dignity and the right to be treated with humanity in the CRC
create a positive obligation to establish minimum conditions for
children who are detained or incarcerated. It requires recogni-
tion that children are rights holders with substantive and
procedural rights.
216
Dignity goes to the core of racial discrimination in juvenile jus-
tice. It highlights the humiliating treatment of girls in detention, in
court proceedings, and in confinement. It challenges the violence
that characterizes much of the world of children behind bars7.21 It
anticipates that children will rejoin society and become productive
citizens. The core task of illuminating the humanity of our young-
sters involves their dignity and worth. This principle is central to
212. U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10, supra note 53, 28(c).
213. See the Texas Youth Commission ("TYC") sex abuse scandal, cover-up, and col-
lapse, noting high-level administrators' indictments for sexual assault, a subsequent finding
that sixty-five TYC employees had felony records, and the release of 226 children whose
sentences had been improperly "extended." Emily Ramshaw, TYC Freeing 226 Held Past Origi-
nal Terms: Longer Sentences Threatened if Inmates Spoke Out on Abuse, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
May 19, 2007, at 6A; Christy Hoppe, 65 TYC Employees Found to Have Felony Records, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 13, 2007, at 7A; DougJ. Swanson, Officials Indicted in Abuse at TYC: 2
Ex-Administrators Accused of Sex Acts with Teenage Inmates, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 11,
2007, at IA.
214. Supra note 27.
215. Liefaard, supra note 18, at 574.
216. Id. at 584.
217. See generally KIDs BEHIND BARS, supra note 217.
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international human rights law and is enshrined in Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: that all human beings are
born free and equal in dignity and inherent rights."'
This Article is an attempt to seduce child advocates to use the
broader, substantive standards and framework of children's human
rights in our work, our speech, and our thinking. international chil-
dren's law is not a panacea. Like all law, it is standard-setting more
than enforcement. Nonetheless, it is a tool, a palate, a template.
Children's human rights concepts are sometimes congruent,
sometimes overlapping, and sometimes an expansion of U.S. con-
stitutional rights, statutory legislation, and common law. The Roper
invitation and challenge is to integrate the law of other nations and
peoples with U.S. traditions. Try it, three times to make sure.
218. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217A, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948).
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